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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7503(a): Party can stay action without initiating arbitration.
Under CPLR 7503, a party aggrieved by another's failure to arbi-
trate can move, either in a pending action or in an independent special
proceeding, to compel arbitration. Under CPA 1451, another remedy
- a motion to stay the action -was provided for expressly, but the
present statute merely states that granting a motion to compel arbitra-
tion automatically stays a pending suit. Did the revision in the law
eliminate the remedy previously available to a party who wishes to
stay an action without initiating arbitration proceedings?228
In Board of Education v. Delle Cese,229 the Supreme Court,
Oneida County, concluded that the stay is still available to such a
party. Plaintiff had served his complaint after expiration of the time
in which arbitration could have been instituted. Defendant S'Doia
moved for summary judgment, on the ground that a stay was not
available, and later for a stay. The court held that S'Doia was entitled
to a stay but not to summary judgment.230 It reasoned that the power to
stay is either inherent in CPLR 7503231 or available under CPLR 2201,
which authorizes a court to "grant a stay of proceedings in a proper
case . . . ." A mutual agreement to arbitrate, the court reasoned, is a
proper case. 2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
DRL 210: Time limit is merely a statute of limitations.
Prior to the Divorce Reform Act of 1966, a plaintiff could obtain
a divorce in New York solely on the ground of adultery, if he com-
menced his action within five years from the date of discovery of the
adultery.233 This five-year requirement was held to be a statute of
limitations. 28 4 However, under another provision 285 a plaintiff was
obligated to disprove certain possible defenses, of which the elapse of
five years from discovery was one, in the event the defendant de-
228 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 136 (1965).
229 65 Misc. 2d 473, 318 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1971).
2 30 See 8 WK&M 7503.19. Under CPA 1451, summary judgment was improper, because
a stay was the exclusive remedy. E.g., American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297
N.Y. 322, 79 NXE.2d 425 (1948).
231 65 Misc. 2d at 478, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 51, citing Adelphi Enterprises, Inc. v. Mirpa,
Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 1019, 307 N.YS.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 172 (1970).
232 Id. at 478, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 51-52.
288 DRL 171(3).
234 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910).
235 DRL 174, repealed, L. 1966, ch. 254, § 4.
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faulted.280 Presently, DRL 211 requires satisfactory proof of the ground
for divorce without mentioning negation of possible defense in default
cases. However, DRL 210, with certain exceptions herein inapplicable,
prohibits the maintenance of a divorce action based upon a ground
which arose more than five years before institution of the action. Is the
time limit in DRL 210 an inherent part of the cause of action or merely
a statute of limitations?
The Supreme Court, Queens County, in Figueroa v. Figueroa,237
held that said time limit is a statute of limitations which must be
pleaded affirmatively. Therein, plaintiff sought a divorce on the basis
of acts which occurred some twenty years before commencement of the
action and defendant defaulted. 238 The general rule in determining the
status of a time limit is:
If a statute creates a cause of action and attaches a time limit to
its commencement, the time is an ingredient of the cause. If the
cause was cognizable at common law or by other statute law, a
statutory time limit is commonly taken as one of limitations and
must be asserted by way of defense.239
While divorce in New York is purely statutory,240 the court concluded
that the Legislature intended to retain the five-year statute of limita-
tions governing divorce actions.24 1
The court's conclusion is consistent with the policy underlying the
new divorce law:
Implicit in the statutory scheme is the legislative recognition that
it is socially and morally undesirable to compel couples to a dead
marriage to retain an illusory and deceptive status and that the
best interest not only of the parties but of society itself will be
furthered by enabling them to extricate themselves from a per-
petual state of marital limbo.24 2
236 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 143 N.Y. 235, 38 N.E. 288 (1894).
237 66 Misc. 2d 257, 520 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1971).
238 Id. at 258, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
239 Romano v. Romano, 19 N.Y.2d 444, 447, 227 NE.2d 389, 392, 280 N.Y.S2d 570,
573 (1967).
240 Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 49 NXE. 663 (1898); Bishop v. Bishop, 62 Misc.
2d 436, 308 N.YS.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
24166 Misc. 2d at 260, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 116. This conclusion is in accord with author-
ities on domestic relations law. E. BISKIND, BOARDmAN's Nmv YORK FAMILY LAW § 202,
at 807 (1964); F. FosrER & D. FRED, LAw AND THE FAmILY, Nmv YORK: DIvoRcE, SEPARA-
TION AND ANNULmENT § 7:7 (supp. 1970). See Smith v. Smith, 55 Misc. 2d 172, 284 N.Y.S.2d
501 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967), citing 1966 REPORT OF THE JoINT LiStATIVE Commrrraa
OF THE LEGIsLATURE 98.
242 Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 55-36, 256 N.E.2d 513, 517-18, 308 N.Y.S.2d
347, 551-52 (1970), quoting Adelman v. Adelman, 58 Misc. 2d 803, 805, 296 N.Y.S.2d 999,
1003 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969) and citing Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without
Perjury, 52 VA. L. RLrv. 52, 81-87 (1966).
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It is most unlikely that the Legislature intended DRL 210 to be a con-
dition precedent to dissolution of a dead marriage. Rather, the section
is a statute of limitations which defendant waived in Figueroa.243
DRL 211: Service of complaint with summons does not void summons.
Service of summons and complaint in a divorce action is governed
by DRL 211, under which a complaint cannot be validly served prior
to termination of conciliation proceedings.
In Vander Kamp v. Vander Kamp,244 a plaintiff directed service
of both summons and complaint upon defendant before termination of
conciliation proceedings. The summons lacked the endorsement "Ac-
tion for a Divorce" required by DRL 232, and service of the complaint
before said termination violated DRL 211. After termination, plaintiff
served a second copy of the complaint upon defendant. Defendant
answered and then moved in the supreme court to dismiss the action,
on the ground that service of the complaint with the summons prior to
termination invalidated both.245 The court denied this motion, holding
that only service of the complaint was voided under DRL 211.24 6 Then
it deemed the defective summons amended to include the necessary en-
dorsement, since defendant was fairly advised of the action.24T
Correction of the formal defect of the complaint by deeming it
amended, is clearly appropriate in this case; defendant was not misled
by the oversight and dismissal would waste time and money. Similarly,
upholding service of the summons is appropriate, for there is no
authority to the effect that simultaneous service of summons and com-
plaint vitiates both.
DRL 234: Judgment granting exclusive possession cannot be circum-
vented by partition under RPAPL 901.
When marriage terminates in divorce, real property previously
possessed by the parties as tenants by the entirety automatically be-
comes realty held by them as tenants in common.248 This transmuta-
tion renders the property amenable to partition. Under section 901 of
the RPAPL a tenant in common in possession can obtain partition.
24366 Misc. 2d at 117, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
244 65 Misc. 2d 934, 319 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971).
2451 d. at 935, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 935, 319 N.YS.2d at 202, citing Apploff v. Apploff, 55 Misc. 2d 781, 287
N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
248 Yax v. Yax, 240 N.Y. 590, 148 N.E. 717 (1925); Stelz v. Schreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 28
N.E. 510 (1891).
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